on use of mental health services by and mental health treatment expenditures for Medicaid beneficiaries from July 1991 to June 1992. During this period three community mental health centers (CMHCs) provided mental health services to Medicaid beneficiaries in their cacchment areas in return for capitated payments. Utilization and expenditure rates per beneficiary per month were analyzed using a "fixed-effects" statistical modeling approach, controlling for categories of beneficiary, time trends, seasonal effects, and CMHC grouping (capitated urban, capitated rural, noncapitated urban, and noncapitated rural). The results of the analysis suggest that the UPMHP reduced admissions for inpatient mental health treatment, inpatient mental health expenditures, and total mental health expenditures for Medicaid beneficiaries. These findings must be regarded as preliminary because of the relatively short time period covered by the data. U sing capitated payment rates to reimburse mental health care providers has been a controversial issue for Medicaid programs. In theory, because capitated payments assign responsibility for the financing and delivery ofservices to a single organizational entity, they could lead to reduced use of expensive inpatient settings, increased use of less costly outpatient programs, and reductions in overall Medicaid expenditures.
The two capitated reimbursement models most commonly used by Medicaid programs to pay for mental health services are the "mainstream" model and the "carve-out" model. 1 Under the mainstream approach, Medicaid contracts with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to provide physical and mental health care under one capitated payment. D ATAWATCH 1 61 coordination and continuity of mental and physical health care.
Under the carve-out approach, which has two distinct variations, Medicaid bundles all mental health services under a separate capitated payment. In the first variation (used in Massachusetts and Iowa), Medicaid contracts with a single entity to manage all mental health care treatment for beneficiaries in the state. In the second variation (used in Utah), Medicaid contracts with local mental health care organizations to provide mental health services to beneficiaries in various geographic areas of the state. A potential advantage of either carve-out approach is that financial and treatment accountability reside with provider organizations that are experienced in the coordination and delivery of mental health care. An additional potential advantage of the "local" carve-out model is that community-based providers that are familiar with the Medicaid population in their regions manage the Medicaid contract.
In this DataWatch we provide preliminary evidence concerning the effect of a local carve-out model, as implemented in the state of Utah, on Medicaid mental health service use and expenditures. In April 1990, under a waiver provided by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), Utah solicited proposals from entities within the state to provide mental health services for Medicaid beneficiaries on a capitated basis. To qualify, bidders had to be able to directly provide, or subcontract to provide, the full range of mental health services covered by Medicaid. Six of the eleven community mental health centers (CMHCs) in the state submitted bids; three CMHCs withdrew during contract negotiations, and the state finalized contracts with the three remaining CMHCs. The catchment areas of these contractors contain about 52 percent of the state's Medicaid-eligible persons. In the areas of the state not covered by capitated contracts, Medicaid continued to reimburse providers on a fee-for-service basis. Of the three CMHCs participating in the Utah Prepaid Mental Health Plan (UPMHP), one has a predominantly urban catchment area (Salt Lake County and Summit County), and approximately 80 percent of the Medicaid beneficiaries receiving capitated mental health care live in this area. There is roughly the same distribution of urban versus rural Medicaid beneficiaries residing in the catchment areas of noncapitated CMHCs.
This DataWatch focuses on the expenditures of the Medicaid program in Utah for mental health care, and the use of mental health services by Medicaid beneficiaries, during the first year of the UPMHP. In the first year the contractors received a capitated payment for all mental health services, but actual expenditures for outpatient care were reconciled at the end of the year with outpatient expenditures as budgeted under the capitated rate. If actual outpatient expenditures were greater, the state reimbursed the contractors for the difference. If expenditures were less, contractors re-turned the difference to the state. Therefore, the contractors were not at financial risk for outpatient care. With respect to inpatient care, the contractors were allowed to keep the difference between budgeted and actual expenditures if that difference was positive, with the state reimbursing the contractors if the contractors experienced losses in the provision of inpatient care. In July 1992 the contracting CMHCs assumed full financial risk for inpatient care, and in January 1994 they assumed that risk for outpatient care as well.
The structure of the financial incentives suggests that reductions in rates of service use, if they occur, are most likely to be observed with respect to inpatient mental health care. The use of outpatient services at the contracting CMHCs could increase during the first year if outpatient care is substituted for inpatient care. Alternatively, rates of outpatient use could decline if giving a single source of care (the contracting CMHC) the responsibility for managing all mental health care results in better coordination of service delivery, or if the contracting CMHCs were not adequately staffed to meet the increase in demand brought about by the requirement that all Medicaid beneficiaries in their service areas were entitled to receive care from them or from providers under contract to them.
A core set of measures is used here to compare mental health care use and expenditures in the first year of the UPMHP for Medicaid beneficiaries in capitated and noncapitated CMHC catchment areas. The null hypothesis is that there will be no differences in expenditure and utilization rates for beneficiaries between the capitated and noncapitated sites during the first year, because of the limited financial risk faced by the contractors.
Analytic Approach
The analysis of utilization and expenditures is based on a before/ after (pre/ post) comparison with a contemporaneous comparison group. Both features are essential to drawing appropriate inferences about the effects of capitation in the absence of a randomized controlled trial. A major concern in conducting the comparison of expenditures and service use in contracting and noncontracting sites is that something will be confounded with the presence of the UPMHP that will cause, or be correlated with, utilization and expenditures in its own right. For example, if the noncontracting sites have historically different use rates or populations at risk, or if there are secular changes in use, then either pure before/ after or pure cross-sectional comparisons would generate biased estimates of the impact of the UPMHP. The pre/ post aspect of the design controls for historical differences among the CMHCs. Failure to adjust for such differences could lead to a biased assessment of capitation because of selection effects. The use of a contem-D ATAWATCH 1 63 poraneous control group adjusts for secular trends that may be confounded with treatment in the capitated CMHCs. Failure to control for such trends could provide a biased estimate of the effect of the UPMHP. For example, in the data set being analyzed, hospital admission rates decline somewhat for the three precapitation years and the first year of the UPMHP. A simple pre/ post comparison involving only the contracting sites could show a significant effect for the UPMHP, when the program, in fact, may have had no effect.
In the simplest case, the effects of secular trends could be estimated using the experience of the comparison group. The estimated trend would be "post" period use minus "pre" period use. The corresponding "post-minuspre" measure for the capitated sites includes both the effects of the UPMHP and the time trend. An unbiased estimate of the program effect would be the difference between these two trends ("post" for capitated sites minus "pre" for capitated sites) minus ("post" for uncapitated sites minus "pre" for uncapitated sites). This approach is sometimes known as a "difference-ofdifference" estimator.
The actual analysis is more complicated than this, because of possible site differences and the use of additional explanatory variables. To conduct the analysis, we used variants of a "fixed-effects" model. 2 The inclusion of indicator variables for sites is particularly important in the analysis, given the prominence of the Salt Lake County site in terms of the high proportion of state Medicaid beneficiaries residing there. However, one of the unavoidable consequences of the fixed-effects model, which uses indicator variables for sites, is that the effect of the time-invariant site characteristics cannot be determined. (Given the limited precision permitted with the data used in this study, the use of more precise, but potentially inconsistent, random-effects modeling to generate estimates for the effects of timeinvariant site characteristics was rejected.)
Another important consideration in the specification of the empirical model is the level of aggregation for the dependent variable(s). For a population of frequent users of mental health care, interview data on mental health status and sociodemographic characteristics could have been used to supplement claims data when investigating differences in utilization between program and comparison groups of Medicaid beneficiaries. However, for the general Medicaid population, it would be prohibitively expensive to interview a sample large enough to detect significant differences in mental health care use at the individual beneficiary level, because of the relative rarity of mental illness episodes, especially inpatient admissions. This argues against using a random sample of Medicaid beneficiaries to analyze the impact of the demonstration on service use. Instead, the analysis uses a time series of aggregate rates of service use and expenditures to The aggregate rates are developed on a monthly basis for the three years prior to the start of the demonstration and the first year of the UPMHP. The denominator for the rate calculations is the number of Medicaideligible persons residing in the catchment area of a CMHC each month. These catchment areas are defined by the county of a beneficiary's residence. Conceptually, eleven rates (equal to the number of CMHCs) could be calculated monthly for each category of service, with the numerator equal to service use that month by beneficiaries in a given area. However, in the statistical analysis, service areas are aggregated into four groups because of the small number of inpatient admissions, on a monthly basis, in some rural CMHC catchment areas. These four service areas are grouped as capitated rural, capitated urban, noncapitated rural, and noncapitated urban. This process generates forty-eight (four areas times twelve months) rates of service use per year for each type of service (assuming complete data) and results in a panel data set consisting of 192 rates per type of service over the course of the three years prior to the UPMHP and the first year of the program. Three types of services are included in the analysis: inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, and emergency room visits. Equations are estimated for two expenditure variables: inpatient expenditures and total mental health care expenditures. Medicaid. An obvious question of interest to the Medicaid program is whether total Medicaid expenditures for inpatient treatment and for all mental health services are lower in the UPMHP sites. We addressed this issue by comparing average expenditures per beneficiary per month in the noncontracting sites with expenditures in the contracting sites for three years prior to the UPMHP and the first year of the program. Medicaid claims are used to calculate expenditures per beneficiary per month in the comparison sites. For the three years prior to the UPMHP these measures can be constructed for the contracting sites as well. In the first year of the demonstration, however, the contracting CMHCs were reimbursed on a capitated rather than a fee-for-service basis, so there were no "claims paid" data for beneficiaries in these sites. However, the contracting CMHCs submitted encounter forms that were used in reconciling outpatient reimbursements under the capitation rates and in documenting inpatient rates. Thus, for contracting CMHCs, expenditures that would have occurred if the centers had been paid fee-for-service can be calculated. Then, the same statistical methods as described in the analysis of utilization rates can be applied to the analysis of expenditure rates.
Estimating the effect of the UPMHP on Medicaid expenditures was complicated by several considerations. Although the CMHCs received a capitation payment for outpatient care, actual payments were determined D ATAWATCH 1 65 based on a reconciliation of the shadow claims data and the capitation payments at the end of the first year of the UPMHP. In effect, the CMHCs were paid the amount indicated in their shadow claims. Therefore, comparison of the shadow claims expenditures in the capitated sites with the actual expenditures in the noncapitated sites, using the statistical approach described above, provides a valid estimate of the impact of the UPMHP on actual Medicaid expenditures for outpatient mental health care during the first year of the program. The same approach cannot be used for inpatient care, since the CMHCs were allowed to keep the difference between their capitation payment and actual costs, if that difference was positive. Therefore, if the capitation payment were set at a relatively high level, it is possible that Medicaid expenditures for inpatient mental health care could increase under the UPMHP, even if hospital utilization rates decreased. To assess the impact of the UPMHP on inpatient expenditures, total capitation payments are compared with projections of what Medicaid expenditures would have been at the capitated sites in the absence of the UPMHP. These projections are made using the expenditure equations for inpatient care, estimated as described above.
Data
Data on service use by Medicaid beneficiaries are taken from the Utah Medicaid claims files. The Medicaid eligibility files include the county codes of the residences of Medicaid beneficiaries, which are used to place beneficiaries in appropriate service areas for the purpose of calculating rates. (A more detailed description of how rates were constructed is available from the authors.)4 Medicaid claims data provide good estimates of service use when providers are paid fee-for-service. This is the case for both capitated and comparison sites for the three years prior to the demonstration and for the comparison sites for the first year of the demonstration. The financial incentives for CMHCs in the UPMHP suggest that underreporting of utilization is not likely to have been an issue in the first year of the program. During this year the CMHCs had a strong incentive to report all care, because their final payments depended on documentation of the services they had provided. been smoothed to eliminate some of the month-to-month fluctuations. For any month the rate is the weighted average of the rates observed in the prior month, the subsequent month, and the month in question, with weights equal to .25, .25, and .50, respectively. Because this smoothing process was used to prepare the graphs, no rates can be shown for the first and last months of the forty-eight-month period. Also, because there was an unexplained drop of more than 50 percent in utilization in February 1991 (not uniformly distributed across categories of beneficiaries), January, February, and March values were not plotted on the graphs for that year. The second section presents the results of the statistical analysis of the data, using the model and statistical techniques described above.
Descriptive data. Hospital utilization rates were essentially stable in the noncapitated sites from July 1989 to July 1992 (Exhibits 1 and 2). Rates were similarly stable in the sites that participated in the CMHC until July 1991, when the program was implemented. Immediately following July 1991, hospital admission rates fell in the contracting sites and remained at a lower level throughout the subsequent year. (In Exhibits 1-4 some declines appear to have occured in the month immediately prior to implementation of the UPMHP. This is an artifact of the "smoothing" procedure used in graphing the data.) The contrasting behavior of hospital admission rates in the participating and comparison sites in the year after the UPMHP was implemented suggests that contracting CMHCs reduced hospital admissions in their catchment areas. Plots of rates for urban versus rural sites (not shown) suggest that the overall decline in admission rates for the participating sites was attributable to a decline in rates at the urban site. Similar trend lines were plotted (but are not displayed in this DataWatch) trend line for inpatient expenditures is similar to that for inpatient admissions (Exhibits 1 and 2). After an initial decline during 1988, these expenditures trend upward at nonparticipating sites from July 1989 through the first year of the UPMHP. In contrast, as was the case for hospital admissions, inpatient expenditures decline in the contracting sites after implementation of the UPMHP. Total expenditures for mental health care (not shown) mirror the plot of inpatient expenditures.
In summary, the descriptive data suggest that the UPMHP reduced hospital use by and expenditures for Medicaid beneficiaries during its first year. The declines in hospital admissions and expenditures are reflected in similar declines in total mental health expenditures per beneficiary during the first year of the UPMHP (not shown).
Statistical analysis. Overall findings. This section summarizes the results from estimating different forms of the general fixed-effects model described above. 5 The results are consistent with the trend lines in Exhibits 1-4. Statistically significant reductions in inpatient admissions and expenditures per beneficiary are associated with implementation of the UPMHP. The magnitude of these reductions is quite large. Hospital admissions at the contracting sites are reduced by almost one-sixth under the model specification (that provides the best fit to the data). This translates into even larger proportionate reductions in expenditures. Inpatient expenditures would have been $12.02 per beneficiary per month without the UPMHP, but actual expenditures (if the contracting CMHCs had been reimbursed based on shadow claims data) would be $6.72. This is a reduction of about two-fifths in inpatient expenditures for mental health care. Analysis of D ATAWATCH 1 69 inpatient days and length-of-stay suggests that the reduction in inpatient expenditures is largely a consequence of decreases in admissions, rather than reductions in length-of-stay.
Total expenditures for mental health services are estimated to be lower under the UPMHP, with reductions ranging from $4.42 to $5.32 per beneficiary per month, depending on model specification. These estimates are significant at the .01 level or better. The estimated reductions in total expenditures (again based on what the contractors would have been reimbursed using their shadow claims) are not quite as great as estimated expenditure reductions for inpatient care alone. Small increases in estimated outpatient expenditures, when averaged with the estimated reductions in inpatient expenditures, could generate this pattern of reductions in overall expenditures. To investigate this finding further, changes in outpatient expenditures were estimated separately and were found to be relatively small and statistically insignificant, with the sign of the estimated change varying by model specification.
To test the sensitivity of the estimates, results were estimated for models where capitation was assumed to reduce rates by X percent, rather than by Y visits or dollars. To do this, the same models were estimated, except that the natural logarithms of use rates and expenditure rates were used as the dependent measures in the analyses.
6 The estimated log model indicates reductions of 17 percent in hospitalization rates, 47 percent in inpatient expenditures, and 17 percent in total expenditures. The corresponding percentage reductions from the linear specification on untransformed outcome measures are 17 percent for hospitalizations, 44 percent for inpatient dollars, and 17 percent for total expenditures.
Variation across beneficiaries. The basic estimates of program effects do not differentiate between groups within Medicaid. As an initial effort to investigate differences across groups, we compared the response to capitation for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and other Medicaid recipients. The test for a differential response was whether AFDC's proportion of hospitalizations or outpatient visits fell or rose after the introduction of capitation, controlling for the population at risk for each program. If it fell, then it must have been because the underlying rate of hospitalizations for AFDC participants in Medicaid fell more than the rate fell for non-AFDC participants. The analysis found that AFDC hospitalization rates fell more with capitation than did the rates for the non-AFDC Medicaid population. Thus, while the overall effect of program participation is statistically significant, this finding seems to reflect a larger reduction in the AFDC part of the Medicaid population.
Savings. Estimates of the savings to Medicaid resulting from the UPMHP during its first year can be divided into two parts. As already noted, since the portion of the capitated payment for outpatient mental health care is reconciled with shadow claims data, the estimated savings to Medicaid for outpatient care can be calculated directly from estimated equations for outpatient mental health expenditures. However, since these equations did not demonstrate conclusively that reductions occurred, we make the conservative assumption that there were no savings to Medicaid relating to outpatient mental health care during the first year of the UPMHP.
The calculation of estimated expenditures for inpatient mental health care must proceed differently. During the first year of the UPMHP, contractors were allowed to retain the difference between their costs for inpatient care, calculated using the shadow claims data, and the inpatient portion of their capitated payment. Thus, although inpatient expenditures were reduced, the cost of inpatient mental health care to Medicaid actually equaled the capitated payment to the contractors. During the first year of the UPMHP, total capitated payments for inpatient care were $5.9 million. To determine if there were savings to Medicaid for inpatient care under the UPMHP, this figure was compared with estimates, generated from the statistical model, of what Medicaid expenditures would have been in the capitated sites in the absence of the UPMHP. Using this approach, predicted expenditures for inpatient mental health care totaled $8.2 million at these sites. Thus, Medicaid saved an estimated $2.3 million in inpatient mental health care expenditures during the first year of the UPMHP. This is a conservative estimate of inpatient savings because the projection of what inpatient expenditures would have been without the UPMHP omits the dollar value of outlier payments for extended inpatient stays under Utah's diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment system. However, these payments historically have averaged less than 5 percent of total inpatient expenditures for mental health care. Also, during the first three months of the UPMHP the inpatient capitated rate at the urban contracting site was set higher than for the subsequent nine months, as compensation for transition costs incurred at that site. If the lower rate had been in effect for the entire first year of the UPMHP, estimated Medicaid savings on inpatient care would have been larger.
Conclusions
The results of the analysis suggest that the UPMHP reduced Medicaid expenditures for mental health care during its first year by a substantial amount. The reduction in total expenditures was largely the result of a reduction in inpatient expenditures, which in turn was caused primarily by a reduction in admissions for inpatient mental health treatment at the capitated sites. These reductions appear to be larger for the AFDC popula-D ATAWATCH 1 71 tion. Therefore, the hypothesis of no reduction in mental health service use and expenditures during the first year of the UPMHP should be rejected, when applied to inpatient care. This finding is consistent with other reports in the published 1iterature.
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While the estimated reductions in inpatient admissions and expenditures are statistically significant and relatively large in magnitude, several caveats to the conclusions must be noted. First, the number of time periods observed under the UPMHP in this analysis is relatively small. Thus, there was little precision on differential time trends across contracting and noncontracting sites. As data from years two and three of the UPMHP become available, the models will be reestimated. Second, the first-year experience of a new program may not indicate steady-state program effects. Even if the estimated first-year effects on inpatient use and expenditures are real, they may not be sustained as the program matures, or they may grow over time. Again, this will be investigated by reestimating the models, adding data from subsequent program years.
Third, while the structure of the analysis reported here is appropriate for assessing overall program impacts, the analysis is relatively aggregate in nature. A more detailed analysis, using a six-year data set, will be conducted involving comparisons across all beneficiary categories and with expenditures for physical health services over the same period. The impact of the UPMHP on outpatient visits and expenditures also will be investigated in greater detail. Finally, this analysis does not address important issues relating to the impact of the demonstration on mental health status, access to services, satisfaction with services, or quality of care. To address these issues, in-person interview data and medical records information, collected over three and one-half years for a sample of schizophrenic Medicaid beneficiaries, are being analyzed.
With these caveats, the first-year experience of the UPMHP suggests that states can achieve savings in Medicaid expenditures by "carving out" mental health coverage through contracts with local mental health care delivery organizations. These organizations apparently reduce costs by reducing inpatient admissions for mental health treatment. There was no evidence that any short-term increase or decrease in expenditures for outpatient mental health care accompanied these reductions in inpatient expenditures. 
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